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We explore the consequences of incomplete information in the stable marriage problem. When
information capacity of the participants is increased, more favorable games are created and the
quality of the matches are also better. The simple model serves as a metaphor for a world with ever
more computing power that leads to more positive inter-personal interactions and of higher quality.
I. EVER MORE COMPUTING POWER
Computing power has been increasing at a spectacular
rate in the last two decades. According to the popu-
lar Moore’s law, it doubles every 18 months. And this
trend will not end in a foreseeable future. At the turn of
century, pundits predict future exploitations of this mon-
strous amount of computing power: long term weather
forecast, DNA decoding, and other grandiose projects. In
this essay I would emphasize another broad area where
this huge computing power can be used for the bene-
fits of the human society. Ever more mutually beneficial
inter-personal relations, be they economic or social, are
created and improved by increased information. Before
I advocate the broader thesis I want to examine in some
detail a metaphor model, the Stable Marriage Problem
(SMP).
II. STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM METAPHOR
Gale and Shapley introduced this model as an opti-
mization problem more than three decades ago[1]. Game
theorists and economists are familar with it and recently
physicists have also shown considerable interest. I refer
readers to the previous work[2] for the complete descrip-
tion of the problem as well as more recent applications.
Let us consider the simplest version. A world consists
of N men and N women. Each has a wish list ranking
the individuals of the opposite sex and all the lists are
randomly chosen. For example on the wish list of man 1,
Claudia is the top choice and Monica the second and so
on till the last woman; man 2 has completely indepen-
dent taste, and his list is a random reshuffling of the N
women. But women have also their wish lists. The prob-
lem states that N marriages should be established by all
the members of this world. Achieving one’s top choice is
hard because of competition from rivals and your dream
partner may not have reciprocal feelings. Recently it has
been shown [2] there are about only N possible stable
matches, out of N ! possible combinations.
III. LIMITED INFORMATION CAPACITY
The model, like many other examples in economic
theory, implicitly assumes that information is infinitely
available. To establish a wish list of N possible partners
is no easy matter. A tremendous amount of information
is needed to study them all and to process all the informa-
tion to establish one’s list. In this essay I want to make a
crucial modification, that each member of this world has
only limited information processing power, hence he/she
cannot establish a complete wish list. I reexamine the
stable marriage problem allowing only limited informa-
tion capacity to each member. Then I shall let this limit
gradually increase to see what benefit, if any, increased
information can bring to the members of this toy world.
Let us first recall the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm.
Men propose and women judge. In order for men to pro-
pose, they have to know exactly whom they want in all
circumstances: e.g. if man 1 is rejected the 99th time,
he knows whom he should propose to on his 100th try.
Women in the GS scenario, on the other hand only de-
cide, upon evaluating proposals. Each woman receives
only a finite number of proposals, and this number is on
average just one. Since women are passive players their
wish list is superfluous. Such waste is now disallowed if
information processing is costly. The same GS algorithm
is re-interpreted so that women don’t have their wish list,
being deprived of information processing power. To be
politically correct, one notes that the roles of men and
women can be inverted. Women nevertheless process the
necessary judgemental power when more than one can-
didates wooing, she can choose among them, given that
each time this number is rarely much larger than one.
IV. MEAN FIELD THEORY
Let us next assume that both men and women have
only limited information processing power. The complete
wish list requires examining N potential partners. Let us
assume men can only check out a subset ofM women and
women K men, with the constraint N ≥ M ≥ K. Each
person’s subset is chosen randomly from the total pop-
ulation of the opposite sex. In reality no one knows all
other people. We still consider the complete wish list for
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each, which only God knows and it allows evaluating how
well they fare with limited information. We further as-
sume that both men and women are active players: they
each time make one proposal and evaluate possible can-
didates as well. Gale-Shapley is an extreme case where
women do not have their lists. Another extreme case is
when both men and women have complete information,
N = M = K. For this latter case let us estimate their
compromise point X , measured as the distance from the
top choice. Since both men and women are active play-
ers, X must be equal for everybody on average. A man
sends out, one each time, a total of X applications, be-
fore finding a spouse. Each of these X applications has
the probability of X/N of being accepted, since women
have the same pretention as men. Thus the total prob-
ability of acceptance for a person X2/N must be unity
to be matched. This leads to the result X =
√
N , which
is qualitatively correct, as compared to the exact results
using more elaborate methods[2]. The above approach is
sometimes called ‘mean field approximation’ in physics.
In the current case this approximation turns out to be
quite accurate, and lends easy generalizations when lim-
ited information is considered.
Now a man has only a partial wish list (M < N).
Without loss of generality we consider these M women
uniformly distributed on his would-be complete list of N .
This supposes that his list is sparse, with the average in-
terval of N/M . Suppose in a world with 1000 women,
but his subset contains only 10. We consider on average
that his 10 female acquintances punctuated on his vir-
tual list of 1000. If he is rejected by his first choice, he
would propose to his second choice, oblivious of about
100 women better than his second choice on his partial
list. Denote byX the distance that a man has to go down
before he finds his spouse and Y likewise for a woman.
The game starts by each man and woman proposing to
someone and evaluating possible proposals received at
each time step. Since a woman’s list is sparser than that
of a man, she goes down her list faster. By the time all
men and women find a suitable spouse they have gone
down distances X and Y , respectively. A man sent out
a total of XM/N proposals and a woman Y K/N , on av-
erage. Each proposal from a man has a chance of Y/N
being accepted. Therefore XYM/N2 is the probability
that a man’s proposal being accepted. Likewise, mar-
riages due to a woman’s initiatives have the probability
of XYK/N2. The total marriages thus formed can be
divided into three categories: 1) men initiatives only; 2)
women initiatives only; 3) mutual initiatives. The first
is realized when a man proposed and a woman accepted
but he was not on her list. The second is with men
and women inverted. The third is due to mutual initia-
tives when both a man and a woman happen to have
each other on their list. The total probability must be
normalized to unity. The normalization relation turns
out to be: XYM/N2 +XYM(1 − K/N)/N2 = 1. The
first term is the sum of probabilities of type 1 and type
3 marriages; the second term is the probability of mar-
riages of type 2 in which a woman proposed to a man
but he did not have her on his list, in other words ex-
clusively due to a woman’s initiatives. On the other
hand, since information is costly men and women go
down their lists one step each, we obtain another relation:
XM = Y K. Two relations and as many variables lead
us to the solution: X = N
√
M/
√
(M +K −MK/N)K
and Y = N
√
K/
√
(M +K −MK/N)M .
V. MORE INFORMATION IMPROVES THE
WORLD
The first conclusion is that X < Y , i.e. more informa-
tion gives an edge to men over women since M > K.
Whoever has more information enjoys better benefit.
Now abolish the constraint M > K, women are allowed
equal or more information than men. We want to know
with increased information on the women’s side unilater-
ally, how the benefits (X,Y ) change.
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FIG. 1. Increasing K while holding M fixed. The vertical
axis is the partner’s ranking. The upper curve (always on the
left side) is man’s partner’s ranking, the lowest curve is that
of woman, steadly increasing with K. The middle curve is the
sum of the two rankings, a monotone increasing function of
K.
On Fig.1 we plot X,Y against K, with N = 1000 and
M = 100 held constant. We see that when K < M ,
women fare worse than men. As K reaches M , the ben-
efits equalize X = Y . And as women surpass men in
information capacity, their benefit increases consistently.
During this process, men’s benefit deterioriates, even
though their information capacity does not. However,
closer scrutiny reveals that the women’s gain is larger
than the men’s loss. It can be easily checked that the
first derivatives of S = X + Y respect to K and M are
both negative-definite. This implies that the model is
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not a zero-sum game. Increased information, even uni-
laterally, is beneficial to the society’s total. We may
also examine the information asymmetry between men
and women. Let the total information capacity be fixed
M + K = const. We may increase K and at the same
time reduceM . Of course the benefit to women increases
and that to men decreases. What is more interesting is to
consider the total sum, in economics language the total
size of the economic pie. In our case the total size is the
sum of N −X of pie-slice for men and N −Y for women.
1 10 100
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1000
FIG. 2. The sum of rankings of man and woman. Total
M+K fixed but changing K and M. The social optimum is
attained with K and M equal.
In Fig.2 we see that the pie’s total size is largest when
at the symmetrical pointM = K. What we can conclude
is that the information capacity can bring a considerable
edge to a relation which is in principle beneficial to both
sides. This benefit is not divided equally. If the pie is
divided in the middle, the pie’s size is actually the largest.
This and other non-zero-sum games are discussed in the
chapterMagic Pie, in a forthcoming book[3]. We see that
unilateral information increase is the least effective way
to increase the society’s total benefit. Ideal is the special
case that both men and women at equality (M = K): we
have X = Y = N/
√
2M −M2/N .
We may ask if there is unequal information capaci-
ties between two groups initially and capacities increase
simultaneously on both sides. Would the two groups’ rel-
ative benefits stay the same? This is a relevant question
since if there is some initial inequality, it is more natu-
ral that information capacity would rain down on them
indiscriminately. We can answer this question using our
above model. Benefits to men is N − X and that of
women N − Y . Now assume the information capacities
increase by the same factor: in the places of M and K
we have αM and αK, where α is a constant larger than
unity. The relative benefits can be defined as the ratio,
R = (N − Y )/(N − X). Assuming K < M initially,
it can be verified that R increases monotonically as α.
Thus we can conclude that within our model the weaker
side’s relative benefits increase with unifromly increas-
ing information capacities. This is important since the
uniform increase is probably the most realistic way. It’s
comforting to know that the weaker side improves faster
than the stronger side.
VI. RISK OF BEING LEFT ALONE
Next, consider that our men and women are not so
easily pleased. There is a threshold below which they
would prefer to stay alone rather than marry. Denote by
η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) the threshold value. 0 means accept-all and
1 reject-all. For example, a woman with η = 0.9 would
find only 10 men acceptable out of a random pool of 100
men, on average. It is quite realistic that a person find
only a small fraction from a random pool of the opposite
sex acceptable. If all those in this small subset do not
reciprocate, then she or he would stay alone.
With limited information capacity men and women
may first encounter the barrier of η, before going down
distances of X and Y . Let us use re-scaled parameters
x = X/N and y = Y/N . The bottom lines for men and
women are xcut = min(x, 1− η) and ycut = min(y, 1− η),
respectively. Therefore if somebody hits her/his bottom-
line before the required distance, she or he risks remain-
ing a bachelor. The number of bachelors in such a world
is B = N max(0, (xcut + η − 1)/xcut) which is a decreas-
ing function with increasing M . For simplicity we con-
sider symmetric case that the information capacity is the
same for both men and women M = K. If all the mem-
bers have too high expectations of their potential mates,
some would remain single even with complete informa-
tion M = N . In modern societies, anecdotal evidence
suggests that people’s expectations are slowly rising, con-
comittantly with increased information capacity. It re-
mains to be seen if information increase can outrun the
ever more demanding wish lists.
Consider the total benefit that increased information
brings to such a society. The benefit for a person is
defined as a linear function (avoiding te need of utility
function) of the distance that her/his spouse measured
from the top choice. In other words, the shorter the
distance the happier he/she is. Denote the function by
g(x) = (1− η − x)/(1− η). This linear (in x) function is
calibrated to the highest value unity when the top choice
(x = 0) is taken and zero at just the threshold (x = 1−η)
and negative below the threshold. The total benefit to
the society is then the integral G(M) = N
∫ xcut
0
g(x) for
the symmetric case.
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FIG. 3. Global gain with increasing information capacity
M for various threshold values.
We see that G(M) shown in Fig.3 is a monotonically
increasing function, which is actually two smooth func-
tions pasted together atM∗, where all the bachelors just
barely find a suitable spouse. When everyone is married,
the benefit continues to increase since on the aggregate
level the distances from the top choices decrease as more
suitable couples are formed.
This is not strictly Pareto-efficient since somebody
may fare worse in the information rich region (large
M). Somebody may have a spouse in an information
poor region (small M) and increased information makes
his/her mate run away with somebody else, and he/she
has to settle with another mate of lower ranking. Be-
fore he/she was enjoying the benefit of ‘ignorance’ of
the spouse. More information enabled spouse now knows
better her/his own available options. However, on the ag-
gregate, the total benefit to the society increases steadily.
Thus a minority of members actually suffer whereas a ma-
jority benefit from enhanced information capacity, even
when the increase is uniform for everyone. The fate of a
particular person’s welfare can be studied in details and
will be discussed elsewhere.
The above discussion may have direct applications in
modeling literally real marriage and dating. Powerful
computers may allow more people access their potential
mates in more and more efficient ways. One should in-
terpret the information capacity broadly: computers also
indirectly power tele-communications, wireless; airlines
ferrying people to meeting places need also computers;
peers of interest groups can have wider reaches with the
internet etc.
VII. MATCHING CONSUMERS AND
PRODUCTS AND BEYOND
However my aim here is to show that the implications
go far beyond marriage, in many other relationships in
the human society. The marriage model serves but as
a metaphor for broader applications. The most relevant
relationship is commercial. Consider the relationship be-
tween firms and consumers. It is generally assumed that
a fair transaction between a firm with a product and a
consumer needing that product is beneficial to both par-
ties. In economics text books it is asserted that the ben-
efit to both sides are equal and the so-called economic pie
is the largest. But modern products and services are com-
plex and ever more so in the future. For the compatible
consumers and firms to find each other and it takes time
and effort. The simple law of supply and demand based
on price alone is not adequate any more. We never know
all the potentially useful products and services available
in the world. Likewise, a firm can never guess right every-
thing consumers want. An essential part of a commercial
transaction lies in searching for each other.
Borrowing from the above marriage metaphor we see
that the economic pie is the largest when information ca-
pacity is equal on both sides. However, it is not hard
to see that in most commercial transactions there is the
perennial information asymmetry between the consumers
and firms. This doesn’t necessarily imply that consumers
are stupid or information challenged. This has more to
do with the fact that for most products/services, con-
sumers care less than firms producing them. What is a
marginal business to a consumer is generally a core busi-
ness to the firm specialized in producing it. With this
asymmetry, the economic pie is not largest, but could
be made larger with the advent of the internet and huge
computing power. More on this (in)efficiency and how
much information asymmetry can be restored are dealt
with in a forthcoming book[3].
Commercial transactions differ from marriage in some
important aspects: a consumer needs multiple prod-
ucts/services simultaneously. In marriage language this
would correspond to polygamy and promiscuity. While
marriage is done once and for all, a commercial relation-
ship is repeated and constant search. A restaurant you
visited last year needs to be checked again for its current
status.
Human relations are not limited to marriage and com-
mercial transactions. In a broad sense each individual
relies more and more on others, especially her/his peers.
In the internet age, peers of a certain activity located
oceans away can find each other. Human creativity can
be boosted by knowing potential demands. Economic in-
stitutions and knowledge institutions become more and
more elaborate, permitting previously unthinkable coop-
erations to be realized, to the total benefit of the human
society.
To have an idea what sort of human relations (noncom-
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mercial) can be matched, think of a plane-load passengers
filled in a narrow space on a trans-atlantic flight. Cur-
rently seating is random in the sense hardly any consider-
ation is given as who your sitting neighbors are. Suppose
in the near future there will be such a service: an air-
line can arrange sitting matches according to some sort
of affinity of interests, just like in marriage. In a recently
work (PRL) Maslov and I have formulated a generalized
information theory giving a framework as how the taste
space can be coded and suitable matches predicted, based
on only a small fraction of observed data. Differing from
marriage is here that sitting matches are only for a short
time span, and new matches have to be arranged over
and over again.
Why passengers would want to be matched? Let’s say
a random pair of passengers assigned to a narrow space
is slightly detrimental to both. If one does not agree
with this assertion, it suffices to observe in a public park
there are some empty and occupied benches. A newcomer
would more likely to choose an empty bench than to sit
next to a stranger. However, in the real world there are
potential positive pairs but they are rare. That’s why
before we have any knowledge about the next person our
attitude is to assume that the average value of the match-
ing between ourselves and that stranger is somewhat neg-
ative. For the sake of arguments let’s assume that among
the pairwise links of the 6 billion people 80% of such po-
tential matches are negative, 20% positive. Among the
20% positive matches 10% are very stimulating, 5% of
the 10% exciting, 2% of the 5% fantastic, and the top
1% has life-changing potential (e.g. a marriage, new job,
life-long friendship). In short positive matches are rare
so lengthy computation is needed to dig them out. Why
an airline is interested in providing such a service? In
any case passengers are matched by random chance, it’s
sensible to provide something with the potential of bet-
ter customer satisfaction. Even though such matches are
not commercial, they certainly can help an airline’s bot-
tomline indirectly.
VIII. SELF-SEARCHING OR MATCHMAKER?
Next we ask the question how do people find each
other. There are two basic modes: 1) everybody searches
for himself; 2) searches are done through a matchmaker.
Fig.4 below gives a caricature of the idea. In the self-
searching mode each enquires about all others, so there
are about N2 enquiries.
In other words the society spends N2 units of effort.
Matchmaker-mediated searches are much more econom-
ical, necessiting only N units of effort. Since informa-
tion is always finite, as we shall see that our problems of
matching the world will be more and more complex. Be-
side the obvious economy of the matchmaker-mode, there
are some general pros and cons of the each alternative.
MM
FIG. 4. Self-searching mode versus matchmaker-searching
mode, the latter has obvious economy of effort.
Besides economy on effort, a matchmaker would try to
make the largest social pie as her goal, i.e. the sum of
the benefits of all the members, minus charges. As we
learn from the SMP that in the self-search mode every-
body strives to improve her own happiness as much as
she can, without any consideration of others. Therefore
the stability is important in determining the final match-
ing. In the illustration Fig.5 below, a miniature model of
two men and women located in a one-dimensional space.
11 22
11 22
FIG. 5. In the upper panel when man 2 and woman 1 hap-
pily married and man 1 and woman 2 very unhappy; if man 2
and woman 1 were considerate by agreeing to ‘sacrify’ a little,
the total social benefit is greatly enhanced (sum of distances
is smaller).
The attractiveness is defined as the separation distance
between a man and a woman. The closer a man to a
woman, more attractive they are to each other. If we
let them do self-searches, man 2 and woman 1 would
like to be matched, and man 1 and woman 2 have no
alternative but to accept the bad match. The total social
costs equal the sum of the two lengths, which is high in
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this case. On the other hand, if man 2 and/or woman
1 were slightly considerate they would realize that by
sacrificing a little taking their second best choice, the
social welfare would be greatly improved, as shown in the
second panel. However, they would not care their fellow
citizens’s fate without a propre incentive and institution.
The matchmaker has the social welfare on her mind. Not
because of magnanimity, but her profits derive ultimately
from the membership fees, which are in proportion of
the total social pie. This problem can be handled by
a game theory model similar to that of John Maynard-
Smith, where he typically treats two species of selfish
players. Achieving generalization to games of menage
a trois is straightforward but lengthy, will be presented
elsewhere. It can be shown that two groups with partially
opposing interests (like our men and women in the SMP
model), plus the selfish matchmaker, can achieve superior
social pie and yet stable since each strives to do well
for herself/himself, while inadvently doing good for the
society.
Let’s go back to our SMP model. In a world of 10000
men and 10000 women with only partial information.
The ideal limit with infinite information can be solved [2],
both for self-searching and matchmaker-searching modes.
In the self-searching mode, a person can expect to find
a mate ranked at 100, out of her full wish list of 10000.
In the matchmaker-searching mode, a person can expect
to find a mate ranked 81 on her full wish list, a signifi-
cant improvement taken into account that everybody in
the population gets that much on average. The improve-
ment in rank by 19 is the matchmaker’s edge. In principle
it’s more advantageous for the men and women to join
the matchmaker’s service. When information capability
is limited, the matchmaker’s edge is larger, as shown in
Fig.6.
1 10 100 1000 10000
100
1000
10000
FIG. 6. Matchmaker has the possibility arranging matches
in ground state, which is the upper curve. Self-searching
mode, with partial information fares much less well, including
the special case of complete information.
If the total information capability of the society is
capped by a fixed amount, it’s more effective to let the
matchmaker use it. In the real world it’s likely that both
modes coexist, at least for a long time before the superior
matchmaker institutions become dominant. We see that
in general there can be conflicts between the solution by
a matchmaker and that by individuals themselves. This
is a fundamental conflict since in a viable society one
should not count on people’s selfishless deeds to sustain
it. Our matchmaker acts as if she were the proverbial
benevolent social planner, exists only in pure theory.
However, it is not that outlandish to suggest that such
social-optimal solution can indeed exist, even each indi-
vidual is selfish. We mentioned above that if the fre-
quency of the matches is high (marriages are least fre-
quent examples, supposedly to happen only once in a
lifetime), a selfish individual may forego some of his im-
mediate gains, in hoping to be compensated later. His
reasoning is quite rational: since in frequent matches he
can end up on the sucker’s side as often as on the gainer’s
side. If such an institution (matchmaker in our exam-
ple) exists keeping record of good deeds and being able
to easily enforce the fair-play rule, then it’s to his own
advantage to respect the matchmaker’s ruling, even oc-
casionally he’s summoned to sacrify. The overall benefits
from such an institution is positive since we have nonzero
sum games here. Then this begs the question how often
is often enough?
To get a clue we have to face the reality that an indi-
vidual’s immediate gains are always more important than
future hypothetical debt-repaying, even with the knowl-
edge of effective enforcing is in place. We can model good
deeds by proposing a memory effect: a credit that is done
now decays with time. The decay can be a power law,
or an exponential one, exp(−t/t0). t0 is the time scale
that beyond which the memory about a good deed fades
and is no longer counted. If somebody offered you a cup
of coffee 10 years ago you may not keep that in your
gratitude-to-return list. Shorter is this scale, easier for
the matchmaker to enforce the fair game. In the informa-
tion age possible matches will be ubiquitous and most of
them have a high frequency. We should expect that many
future matchmakers can in fact act as a benevolent plan-
ner. There will be a phase transition: when the frequency
surpasses a given threshold, suddenly the matchmaking
mode becomes viable. The society may not respond right
away, but the superiority of the matchmaker mode is hard
to resist, just like a super-cooled liquid below the freezing
point.
As an example of higher frequency matchmaking, let us
consider the much hyped third generation wireless com-
munication. The industry is making a trillion dollar bet
on the always-on wireless communication mode. From a
PC to a always-on wireless device, the frenquecy of be-
ing connected is much higher. The industry actually has
not figured out what to do with such a high communi-
cation frequency (not to be confused with the technical
synonym). Proposals are abundant, people might want
to check frequently their stock trading, or to keep track
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their online casino bets, or to digging for more music
feeds, etc. However, we cannot expect most people to
become day traders, to be gambling addicts. The wire-
less future rests on the exploitation of mediating inter-
personal relations, with whatever activities a person does
offline already. This will be appropriately dealt with in
the afore-mentioned book.
IX. IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In a previous section we have introduced the concept
of limited information, that a player can only access a
subset of all the available alternatives. We need now to
address another source of limited information capabili-
ties, i.e. the information obtained in reality is imperfect.
When an agent obtains information about a subject, his
knowledge is only an approximation of the truth. Con-
sider a consumer searching for products, she may have
the capabilities checking on a large number of potentially
useful products, but her results can only be a distorted
picture about the real nature. The perfect truth is un-
knowable. Though better efforts can lead to better pre-
cision in general. We can model imperfect information
through a simple example. Let there be N (even) M -
dimensional binary vectors Vi, i = 1, ..., N . Our task is
a standard matching problem where the vectors have to
be pairwisely matched, and the sum of the all the pair-
wise overlaps has to be minimized. However, now we
have to face a new complication: we cannot determine
the exact nature of each bit. If a bit is 0, we have the
possibility of detecting it both ways: 0, 1. The truth oc-
curs with probability p and the error with 1 − p. First
consider the case 2M > N , i.e. rarely two vectors would
be identical in a given sample. Even with perfect infor-
mation, complete overlap is impossible to achieve, for
the all the vectors, the best match one can obtain is
M ′ ≈ M/2 +
√
M/2 logN < M . Where M ′ denotes
the average best partial overlap. Now consider imperfect
information, and for simplicity we assume 2M < N , so
in principle with perfect information ideal overlaps are
obtainable M ′ = M . Since now the precision is limited,
the best one can hope is the overlap M ′ =Mp.
One important conclusion emerges that the quality of
the matches grows with the number of the potential pool,
but this growth stops at an intrinsic size Nmax. The total
system of N players (here represented by N vectors) ap-
pears to be divided into subsystems of size Nmax, which
turns out to be proportional to
√
M exp (2p− 1)2/M . As
the precision (i.e. p) increases, we see thatNmax increases
exponentially with p. What this analysis means is the fol-
lowing: when the information is very imprecise (small p),
the total system breaks into smaller groups, since intrin-
sically there is no need to search better matching part-
ners in a larger pool. As precision improves, larger pool
brings better matching quality. This is analogous to the
correlation length in physics, the precision p plays the
similar role of inverse of temperature. At high temper-
atures (small p), a physical system loses coherence over
distances larger than the correlation length. As tempera-
tures become lower, the coherence region grows and even
become divergent. In real life matching example can ob-
served almost everywhere. In a primitive society where
information about anything is very imprecise, therefore
the economic activities are confined to limited and iso-
lated groups, with no added advantage of cross-group
contacts. As information becomes abundant and more
precise, the connected region becomes also larger, even-
tually leads to a global economy.
X. LAW OF INDETERMINACY
Lest I give the wrong impression the searching and
matching problem in economic and social relation is re-
duced to an optimization problem, as hitherto is the
founding paradigm in neo-classical economics. Human
beings are different from inanimate objects in that, un-
der searching and matching action, they react. Depends
how effective a searching is done an individual’s quality
(what she can offer) as well as the demand (her wants),
at the same time evolve as the more powerful and effec-
tive searching is being carried out. Economic literature
treats these variables as if as given, immutable objects.
If information is very imprecise and primitive, an indi-
vidual would not be stimulated enough to bring out of
her latent qualities, since she is aware of that it wouldn’t
be appreciated enough anyway. Most these talents need
time and effort to reach their prime, even in best circum-
stances. Likewise, an individual would not wish too much
in a information-challenged society, being forced to be
realistic. And tastes, even the most frivolous, need time
to develop as well. Send a Santa Claus to the famine-
stricken sub-sahara to offer people whatever they want,
few would clamour for a Ferrari, as a Wall Street trader
would.
It’s not hard to model the above idea modifying the
matching problem. In the standard matching problem
described in the last section, we have a Hamiltonian H
which is the sum of all the pairwise overlaps of among
the N vectors. The Boltzmann weight is proportional
to exp−H/T , where T is the temperature. Smaller is
the temperature, better matches would be found since
the rare combinations now receive prominent weights.
When T approaches to zero, the standard matching prob-
lem becomes an optimization problem, and in the past
years have been extensively studied by Parisi and his co-
workers. In our problem of economic and social match-
ing, there is a natural interpretation of the temperature:
more powerful searches correspond to lower tempera-
tures, and in fact we may postulate a relation between
the society’s ”temperature” and the current computing
power. So T can be thought as a function of the aggre-
gate computing power C: T = T (C). It is conceivable
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some simple power laws T = 1/Cα is operative, as some
preliminary analyses show.
The key consideration not to fall into the optimiza-
tion trap is to postulate that human beings react to the
ever more powerful searching and matching. The model
is quite simple, the complexity of an individual is speci-
fied by the dimensionality of the vectors,M . We need to
relax the usual constraint that M being a constant. Un-
der the reduced temperature (more computing power),
M is likely to increase. We may further suppose that
M is a certain function of T : M = M(T ), the smaller
is T , the larger M . We shall see that under the current
”global cooling” tendency, at least as far as computing
power evolution is concerned, our optimization tasks get
more and more difficult. It’s like chasing a running ob-
jective and there is no fixed target to aim, as prescribed
in neoclassical economics. Details about the model and
broader discussion will be presented elsewhere. The most
interesting is to note from such a runaway optimization
problem is that whether the ever more powerful com-
puting power is able to catch up the ever more complex
problem. This depends the choice of M(T ), which ulti-
mately depends on real experimental findings. The most
likely scenario would be that the problem remains just
marginally intractable. Nature reserves enough wisdom
to tease the technically confident people in the pursuit of
‘optimum’. So much is the essence of the law of indeter-
minacy.
XI. PIE-SLICING, MATCHMAKER’S DILEMMA
It is instructive to consider a toy model of matchmak-
ing, to illustrate how a selfish matchmaker can do well
while doing (partial) good for the society. Consider a
club of many members to be matched and a matchmaker-
entrepreneur. The total membershipM =M(b) depends
on the benefit per member b, a supposed given function.
Denote a = a(V ) the attractiveness to a single member,
V is the total investment that the matchmaker plows
back to make the whole game attractive. The individual
benefit b = (1 − γ)a, i.e. the attractiveness received mi-
nus the membership fee f = γa (0 ≤ γ < 1). The total
membership fees collected by the matchmaker is γMa, a
g fraction is kept for profit G = gγMa, the fraction 1− g
is plowed back as investment V = (1 − g)γMa. This
is a self-sustained, static model and can be solved read-
ily. The solution can be expressed as functions of γ and
g. The total membership M = M(γ, g) and attractive-
ness a = a(γ, g), the total social pie Z = Z(g, γ) = Ma,
before profits and investment; the total membership ben-
efits B = (1 − γ)Z; and the profit for the matchmaker
G = γgZ. If the matchmaker has her way, she would
choose γ and g in such a way to maximize her profit G;
if the members have their way, they want to choose γ
and g to maximize their benefit B; finally in a utopia
a benevolent planner would like to see the largest possi-
ble social pie, he would want to see the total gross pie
being largest. Let us limit ourselves to a concrete ex-
ample: a(V ) = (V/V0)
1/3 and M(b) = M0b
1/2. The
utopian largest pie Zmax = 1/4M0
2/V0 can be achieved
with γ = 1/2, g = 0. The membership benefits maxi-
mizing solution gives the gross social pie ZM = 8/9Zmax
with γ = 1/3, g = 0. The matchmaker’s maximal profit
solution with γ = 2/3, g = 1/2 makes the total social pie
considerably smaller Zg = 4/9Zmax.
FIG. 7. First panel shows the utopian social planner can
mediate the largest pie where investment is half of the pie;
the middle panel is what the members wish for, only 1/3
goes to investment; and selfish matchmaker maximal profit is
the realistic outcome, though the pie is the smallest, but still
better than self-searching.
In Fig.7 the panels show the sizes of the gross social
pie, as well as slice-shares. It can be shown that self-
searching mode achieves much less a social pie, here the
membership fee is replaced by a person’s own search ef-
fort costs.
We see that the members and the matchmaker have
partial interest overlap, for that they can be said to live
in a symbiosis. They are mutually interested in hav-
ing a large pie. But this overlap is limited and while
the members want the solution in the second panel, the
greedy matchmaker is interested in having the solution
in the third panel. Denote Σ = B + G, start from the
second panel and hold the investment fraction γ(1 − g)
fixed and increase γ and g to transit to the solution in
the third panel. As a matter of fact in this range it is
a negative-sum game between the matchmaker and the
members since Σ decreases monotonically. The match-
maker would be less greedy as soon as there is compe-
tition. Competition among matchmakers is somewhat
different from firms selling same goods since information
is a very pecular goods. This goes beyond the scope of
this essay.
XII. DOUBLE-STRING FOR TASTE SPACE, OR
SOCIAL DNA
There are many human activities that would benefit
from effective matching. However some activities are eas-
ier to predict and mediate than others. For example, if
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you like neither hot pizza nor hot soup, it’d be a rather
good prediction that you don’t like all other hot food. We
need a systematic way to model people’s tastes and their
affinity. It’s clear that tastes are multi-dimensional, for
simplicity we code them by bit-sequences with each en-
try representing absence or presence of a given attribute.
Our aim is to match people with people or to things.
However, a single bit-sequence is not enough for a per-
son, as his wants and his qualities judged by others are in
general not the same. A short woman may prefer a tall
man, a blond man with blue eyes may prefer a red haired
and green eyed woman. In the simplest model a person
can be characterized by two bit-sequences: one for what
she has to offer Q = (qi, i = 1,m) (Quality), another
what she wants W = (wi, i = 1,m) from others. When
a man is matched to a woman, the happiness of the man
is defined as H = (1− ǫ)h(x)+ ǫf(q1w1, q2w2, ..., qmwm).
where x = q1w1 + ... + qmwm is the overlap, where Q is
the quality-vector for the woman andW wants-vector for
the man. The happiness for the woman can be likewise
defined with appropriate labels. h(x) is a single variable
function, whereas f is a random boolean function of m
bit-variables. For ǫ = 0 there is a lot of coherence among
the preferences in the population. For instance the top
two choices of man 1 would end up in another man’s list
close to each other. In other words the entropy is much
less than that in the ranking case. For ǫ = 1, on the other
hand, everybody’s taste is completely idiosyncratic. In
the above example, the top two choices would end up in
arbitrary places in other men’s list. If ǫ is small, there
is a quite good chance of predicting peers’ tastes, with-
out knowing everybody in the population. This is called
affinity. On the other hand, for ǫ large tastes are very un-
predictable and full knowledge of each individual’s tastes
is needed before a matchmaker can mediate. In reality we
don’t know a priori whether the affairs are easy to pre-
dict or not. To decide, I propose a simple criterion. Take
a person’s top two choices, find the distance of these two
choices in another member’s list. Average this distance
over all other members and repeat the same procedure
by considering all members’ top two choices. Call this
parameter η. It can be readily shown that η = ǫ/2 to
the leading order approximation, using the above ansatz.
An alternative measure would need to calculate the full
entropy.
XIII. OUTLOOK
Let’s end this essay by speculating a bit ahead where
the current information revolution would lead us. If my
view is only partially correct: A small but increasing
fraction of future computing power will go to mediating
human relations. With the increased information capac-
ity each member of the society is made better aware of
her available options. As a result more and more positive-
sum games are formed and their aggregate quality is also
improved. The information age can be roughly divided
into two stages: 1) in the first stage that is about the
last twenty years before the turn of the century, people
make computers connected with the advent of internet
etc. This stage is by no means ending as grid-computing
is just about to start. 2) In the second stage computers
help people connected, in small measures this has already
started. In fact the ever more powerful computing power
pouring into the society matching people together to their
mutual benefit. As information searching and computa-
tion power is increased the entropy of the world in human
resources in further reduced, somehow a compensation
for the entropy loss (increase) of the physical world. In-
deed, more computing power could make a world smaller
and happier.
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